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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
 
IRIS GILLON and IRIS GILLON MUSIC’N 
CELEBRATIONS, LLC d/b/a IGMC, 
 
  Plaintiff, 
 
 v. 
 
HONEY BERNSTEIN, 
 
  Defendant. 
 
 
Civ. No. 2:12-04891 (WJM) 
 
 
OPINION 
 
 
 
 
    
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.: 
 
 This is a defamation case.  Unhappy with the wedding coordination services 
provided by Iris Gillon and Iris Gillon Music’n Celebrations, LLC (together “Plaintiffs”), 
Defendant Honey Bernstein posted a highly critical posting (the “Posting”) on the 
website, www.Ripoffreport.com.  Plaintiffs responded by filing the instant lawsuit, which 
asserts a host of claims sounding in libel and related torts.  Bernstein now moves to 
dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 
arguing that the Posting conveys personal opinions protected by the First Amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States.  There was no oral argument.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b).  
For the reasons set forth below, Bernstein’s motion is GRANTED IN PART, and 
DENIED IN PART. 
  
I. BACKGROUND 
 
  The Complaint states as follows.  Iris Gillon Music’n Celebrations (“IGMC”), 
LLC is an agent and promoter for roughly 200 musicians, caterers, and event vendors.  
Am. Compl. ¶ 22, ECF No. 5.  IGMC is wholly owned by Iris Gillon, IGMC’s lone 
employee.  Id. ¶ 3.  Gillon has never been interviewed or written about as an event 
planner, though she has appeared on the television programs, Platinum Weddings and The 
Apprentice.  Id. ¶ 15. 
 On May 21, 2011, Bernstein hired IGMC to “produce, supervise, and manage all 
music administration” for Bernstein’s son’s August 6, 2011 wedding.  Id. ¶¶ 44-46.  The 
contract called for “5 Musicians Keyboards, Guitar-Vocals, Sax-Vocals, F[emale] Vocal 
and Congas/Trumpet/Vocals and DJ.”  Id. ¶ 47; see also Ex. H-1 to Am. Compl., ECF 
No. 5-4.  IMGC produced these performers for Bernstein’s son’s wedding.  Id. ¶ 49. 
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 On August 9, three days after the wedding, an unhappy Bernstein submitted the 
following Posting to the website www.Ripoffreport.com:  
 
iris gillon, igmc Way below Par service – did not get what was 
contracted for 
 
Iris Gillon and igmc did not deliver acceptable service. Iris is a marketeer 
[sic] par excellence - an unusually good salesperson with an impressive and 
well-designed website. Don’t let these things fool you. My son got married 
this past weekend and (1) the singer was awful (2) the number of musicians 
promised did not show up (3) the band leader had no personality 
whatsoever and though he tried hard to please, could not read the crowd. 
The bands electrical requirements that Iris sent me were all wrong and my 
electrician, at an enormous additional expense, had to work the night of the 
party, in the rain, to make sure that there was enough power. Also, notice 
how the rebuttals to [a different complaint posted on Ripoffreport.com] are 
from employees. I wonder why that is? I would never, ever recommend 
using this company. 
 
Ex. C. to Am. Compl., ECF No. 5-2.  In subsequent correspondence with Gillon, 
Bernstein explained: “my electrician, thankfully, was here when the band arrived and 
they told him something different about their amperage needs than you texted me.”  Ex. 
L. to Am. Compl., ECF No. 5-4. 
 The Posting ultimately became the top result on www.google.com for the keyword 
“Iris Gillon.”  Am. Compl. ¶ 111.  Concerned about negative publicity, Gillon paid 
search optimization companies thousands of dollars to reduce the visibility of the Posting.  
Id. ¶ 114.  Even so, the Posting made at least one of her customers lose confidence in 
Gillon and demand a refund of $3,700.  Id.  Gillon further claims that the Posting has 
scared off potential customers, costing her business thousands of dollars in commissions.  
Id. ¶ 116.    
  
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, 
in whole or in part, if the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
The moving party bears the burden of showing that no claim has been stated.  Hedges v. 
United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir.2005).  In deciding a motion to dismiss under 
Rule 12(b)(6), a court must take all allegations in the complaint as true and view them in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff.  See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975); 
Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage Resorts Inc., 140 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 
1998).   
Although a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, “a plaintiff’s 
obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels 
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and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 
do.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).  Thus, the factual allegations 
must be sufficient to raise a plaintiff’s right to relief above a speculative level, such that it 
is “plausible on its face.”  See id. at 570; see also Umland v. PLANCO Fin. Serv., Inc., 
542 F.3d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 2008).  A claim has “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 
liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (citing 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).  While “[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a 
‘probability requirement’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility.”  Id. 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
 The Amended Complaint contains seven counts.  Count I is a claim for libel.  
Count II is a claim for libel per se.  Count III is a claim for libel innuendo.  Count IV is a 
claim for injurious falsehood.  Count V is a claim for defamatory injury to reputation.  
Count VI is a claim for product disparagement.  Count VII is a claim for false light.  
Bernstein moves to dismiss all counts. 
 
A. Counts I and V: Libel and Defamatory Injury to Reputation 
 
 Count I is a claim for libel.  Count V is a claim for defamatory injury to 
reputation.  Bernstein makes three arguments for why the Court should dismiss these 
counts.  First, Bernstein maintains that the Posting is not defamatory because it is a pure 
statement of opinion.  Second, Bernstein argues that even if the Posting contains 
statements of fact, those statements were not knowingly false.  Third, Bernstein argues 
that Plaintiffs’ damages are speculative.  While the Court concludes that the majority of 
the Posting constitutes protected opinion speech, the Court nevertheless finds that 
Plaintiffs have stated a claim for libel based on one of the two factual statements 
contained in the Posting.   
As the parties do not distinguish between libel and defamatory injury to 
reputation, neither will the Court.  Libel is “defamation by written or printed words, or by 
the embodiment of the communication in some tangible or physical form.”  W.J.A. v. 
D.A., 210 N.J. 229, 238 (2012) (citation and quotation omitted).  To establish defamation, 
a plaintiff must demonstrate several things.   
First, the defendant must have made a defamatory statement.  Singer v. Beach 
Trading Co., Inc., 379 N.J. Super. 63, 80 (App. Div. 2005) (internal quotation and 
citation omitted).  “[W]hether a statement is defamatory is a question of law.”  Cruz v. 
HSBC, No. 10-135, 2010 WL 2989987, at *2 (D.N.J. July 26, 2010).  Defamatory 
statements “tend[] so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation 
of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.”  Ward 
v. Zelikovsky, 136 N.J. 516, 529 (1994) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 559). 
Second, the defamatory statement generally has to be a statement of fact.  Singer, 
379 N.J. Super at 80.  As the New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized, “statements of 
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opinion, as a matter of constitutional law, enjoy absolute immunity.”  Dairy Stores, Inc. 
v. Sentinel Publishing Co., 104 N.J. 125, 147 (1986).  In certain cases, however, opinion 
speech can be defamatory if it is “apparently based on facts about the plaintiff or his 
conduct that have neither been stated by the defendant nor assumed to exist by the parties 
to the communication.”  Yourman v. People’s Sec. Life Ins. Co., 992 F. Supp. 696, 707 
(D.N.J. 1998) (quoting Kotlikoff v. Community News, 89 N.J. 62, 69 (1982)).   
Third, the defamatory statement must concern the plaintiff. Singer, 379 N.J. Super 
at 80. 
Fourth, the defamatory statement must be false.  Id. 
Fifth, the defamatory statement must have been “communicated to a person or 
persons other than the plaintiff.”  Id. 
Sixth, the defendant must have acted with the appropriate level of fault.  Id. The 
fault showing differs depending on whether a plaintiff is a private person or a public 
figure.  “If the plaintiff is a private person, he or she need show only that the defendant 
was negligent.”  McLaughlin v. Rosanio, Bailets & Talamo, Inc., 331 N.J. Super. 303, 
314 (App. Div. 2000).  “If, however, the plaintiff is a public figure, he or she need prove 
that the defendant was motivated by ‘actual malice’—that the defendant either knew the 
statement was false or recklessly disregarded its falsity.”  Id.   
Seventh, the plaintiff must be able to establish “special damages.”  Ward, 136 N.J. 
at 540.  A plaintiff can establish special damages by alleging “that an existing 
relationship has been seriously disrupted.”  Id. 
The Court begins by noting that the majority of the Posting is pure opinion.  For 
example, Bernstein describes Gillon as “a marketeer [sic] par excellence - an unusually 
good salesperson with an impressive and well-designed website.”  Ex. C.  Bernstein adds, 
“I would never, ever recommend using this company.”  Id.  These opinion statements are 
not actionable because the Posting explains why Bernstein feels the way she does.  See 
Yourman, 992 F. Supp. at 707.  For example, Bernstein charges that “the singer was 
awful” and “the band leader had no personality.”  Ex. C.   
While most of the Posting contains pure opinion, “most” does not mean “all.”  The 
Court has isolated two factual statements in the Posting.  The Court refers to these 
statements as “the Musicians Statement” and “the Electricians Statement.”  To the extent 
Counts I-VII rest on any statement in the Posting save the Musicians Statement or the 
Electricians Statement, Counts I-VII are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE because 
they seek to impose liability based on protected opinion speech.    
 
1. The Musicians Statement 
 
 The Musicians Statement is: “the number of musicians promised did not show 
up.”  Gillon has stated a claim for libel based on the Musicians Statement.   
First, the Musicians Statement is a defamatory statement of fact.  If potential 
customers come to people believe that Plaintiffs break their promises, business will likely 
suffer.  Second, the Posting concerns Plaintiffs.  Third, according to the Amended 
Complaint, the Musicians Statement is false because the promised number of musicians 
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came to Bernstein’s son’s wedding.  Am. Compl. ¶ 49.  Fourth, the Musicians Statement 
was communicated to persons other than Plaintiffs because it was posted on a website.  
See Too Much Media, LLC v. Hale, 413 N.J. Super. 135, 167 (App. Div. 2010), aff’d as 
modified, 206 N.J. 209, 20 A.3d 364 (2011) (internet postings libelous if defamatory).  
Fifth, according to the Amended Complaint, Bernstein acted with the requisite level of 
fault.  The contract specified that IGMC would provide five musicians and a DJ.  
According to the Amended Complaint, IGMC fulfilled its promise.  Am. Compl. ¶ 49.  
Construing the facts in the Amended Complaint as true, it is plausible that when Gillon 
posted the Musicians Statement, she either knew it to be false or acted in reckless 
disregard of its falsity.  Finally, Plaintiffs have pled special damages because they allege 
that the Posting caused a customer to lose confidence in Gillon and request a refund. Id. ¶ 
114.  Accordingly, with respect to the Musicians Statement, Gillon has stated a claim for 
libel, and the Court will DENY the motion to dismiss Counts I and V. 
 
2. The Electricians Statement 
   
The Electricians Statement is: “The bands electrical requirements that Iris sent me 
were all wrong and my electrician, at an enormous additional expense, had to work the 
night of the party, in the rain, to make sure that there was enough power.”  Ex. C.  Gillon 
has not stated a claim for libel with respect to the Electricians Statement because she has 
failed to plead fault.   
Nothing suggests that Bernstein was negligent went it came to the truth of the 
Electricians Statement.  After the wedding, Bernstein sent an email to Gillon informing 
her that the band had said that Gillon’s electrical specifications were incorrect. Ex. L.  
Plaintiffs do not challenge the veracity of Gillon’s account of her discussion with the 
band.  Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that Bernstein was careless, or 
negligent, when she posted the Electricians Statement.  Nor have Plaintiffs plausibly 
alleged that Bernstein knew the Electricians Statement was false when she posted it.  For 
these reasons, the Court will GRANT the motion to dismiss Counts I and V WITHOUT 
PREJUDICE with respect to the Electricians Statement.  See Grayson v. Mayview State 
Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116 (3d 
Cir. 2000)) (“[I]f a complaint is vulnerable to 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must 
permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile.”).  
 
B. Count II: Libel Per Se 
 
 Count II is a claim for libel per se.  Here, Plaintiffs maintain that the Posting 
accuses them of a crime, namely fraud, and also of “an inability to perform in [their] 
profession.”  Pls.’ Br. at 9, ECF No. 13.  The Court is persuaded by the former argument, 
but not the latter argument. 
The libel per se cause of action is a variant of the libel cause of action.  “[I]f a 
defamatory statement constitutes libel per se, damages are presumed to exist and need not 
be shown.”  Mayflower Transit, LLC v. Prince, 314 F. Supp. 2d 362, 377 (D.N.J. 2004).  
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“Libel per se includes those comments of ‘occupational incompetence or misconduct.’” 
Id. (quoting MacKay v. CSK Publishing Co., 300 N.J. Super. 599, 616 (App. Div. 1997)).  
It also includes allegations that a defendant has committed a crime.  W.J.A., 210 N.J. at 
240.  
Contrary to Gillon’s argument, the Posting does not accuse her of fraud.  
However, the Musicians Statement and the Electrician Statement do suggest occupational 
incompetence.  Specifically, they suggest that when a person contracts with Plaintiffs, 
Plaintiffs will not or cannot follow through on their contractual obligations.  Accordingly, 
the Court will DENY the motion to dismiss Count II as it pertains to the Musicians 
Statement.  Because the Court has already established that the Electricians Statement is 
not defamatory, the Court will GRANT the motion to dismiss Count II WITHOUT 
PREJUDICE to the extent Count II pertains to the Electricians Statement.   
 
 C. Count III: Libel Innuendo 
 
 Count III is a claim for libel innuendo.  Bernstein argues that Gillon cannot state a 
claim for libel innuendo because Gillon is a “limited public figure.”  “Whether [a] 
defendant . . . is a public figure is a question of law to be determined initially by the 
court.”  City of Rome v. Glanton, 958 F. Supp. 1026, 1041 (E.D. Pa. 1997).  All-purpose 
public figures “occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are 
deemed public figures for all purposes.”  Schiavone Const. Co. v. Time, Inc., 847 F.2d 
1069, 1077 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 
(1974)).  A limited public figure is someone “who, although they are not well known 
throughout the country or on every issue, are nonetheless sufficiently involved in one 
particular arena to qualify as public figures for that purpose.”  Id.  To determine whether 
someone is a limited public figure, the Court must conduct an inquiry that is “difficult 
and fact-specific.”  Id.  While the Complaint notes that Gillon has appeared on at least 
two television programs, Am. Compl. ¶ 15, the Court finds it appropriate to defer the 
public figure inquiry until after the record has been more fully developed through 
discovery.  Accordingly, the Court will DENY Bernstein’s motion to dismiss Count III. 
 
D. Counts IV, VI, and VII: Injurious Falsehood, Product Disparagement, 
and False Light   
 
 Bernstein maintains that Gillon can survive a motion to dismiss with respect to 
Counts IV (injurious falsehood) and VI (product disparagement) if she alleges: “(1) 
publication (2) with malice (3) of false allegations concerning plaintiff’s property or 
product (4) causing special damages, i.e. pecuniary harm.”  IDT Corp. v. Unlimited 
Recharge, Inc., No. 11-4992, 2012 WL 4050298, at *7 (D.N.J. Sept. 13, 2012) (quoting 
Sys. Operations, Inc. v. Scientific Games Dev. Corp., 555 F.2d 1131, 1140 (3d Cir. 
1977)).  Furthermore, to survive a motion to dismiss Count VII (false light), Plaintiffs 
must allege: (1) ‘the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive 
to a reasonable person’; and (2) ‘the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless 
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disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other 
would be placed.’” Leang v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 198 N.J. 557, 589 (2009) (quoting 
Romaine v. Kallinger, 109 N.J. 282, 294 (1988)).  Bernstein’s motion to dismiss Counts 
IV, VI, and VII rests on the arguments she made with respect to Count I.  For the reasons 
stated in its discussion of libel, the Court will DENY the motion to dismiss Counts IV, 
VI, and VII with respect to the Musicians Statement, and it will GRANT the motion 
WITHOUT PREJUDICE with respect to the Electricians Statement. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will GRANT the motion to dismiss IN 
PART, and it will DENY the motion to dismiss IN PART.  To the extent Counts I-VII 
rest on any statement in the Posting save the Musicians Statement or the Electricians 
Statement, they are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE because they seek to impose 
liability based on protected opinion speech.   To the extent they rest on the Electricians 
Statement, Counts I-II and IV-VII are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.   Count 
III survives, as do Counts I-II and IV-VII to the extent those counts rest on the Musicians 
Statement.  An appropriate order follows. 
 
                  /s/ William J. Martini                         
              WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J. 
Date: September 12, 2013 
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